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"Who Killed Cock Robin?" A Retrospective on
the Bork Nomination and A Reply to "Jaffa
Divides the House" by Robert L. Stone*
Harry V. Jaffa**
I am indebted to Dr. Robert L. Stone for his eloquent testi-
monial to my efforts, over more than forty years, to "address
the central question in American constitutional law today,
which is the same question over which the Civil War was
fought." At the same time, I find myself puzzled at his charg-
ing me with "dividing the house." The argument to which he
takes exception is, in principle, the same made by Abraham
Lincoln in his immortal speech of June 16, 1858.
In an utterance that may have changed the history of the
United States, and of the world, Lincoln argued that the
grounds upon which one opposed the extension of slavery into
the territories was inseparable from opposition to slavery itself.
Similarly, I maintain that the ground upon which one argues
for a constitutional jurisprudence of "original intent" is insepa-
rable from such a jurisprudence. No one has ever formulated
the doctrine of "original intent" jurisprudence with greater
perspicacity or eloquence than did Chief Justice Taney in his
opinion in Dred Scott. Furthermore, his judgment that a prop-
erty interest in slaves in the Territories was guaranteed by the"original intent" of the Constitution is reasonable if one takes
the text and history of the Constitution, apart from its moral
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grounding in the principles of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, as the guide to that intent. Although the words "slave"
and "slavery" do not occur in the text of the Constitution of
1787, it was clear that the protection of property in slaves was
the purport of a number of its clauses. One could not tell from
the text, however, whether such protection was extended to
something regarded as a necessary evil, something regarded as
a positive good, or something that, like driving on the right
side of the road, was neither good nor evil until enacted into
positive law.
In the Congress of 1857-1858, the Southern Democrats, led
by President Buchanan attempted to give slavery a permanent
foothold in Kansas by admitting Kansas as a state under the
Lecompton Constitution. However, Lecompton was defeated
in the House of Representatives by a political coalition of
Republicans and free-soil Democrats led by Senator Stephen
A. Douglas. In the spring of 1858, many in the Republican
Party, in particular in its eastern wing, were now willing to
accept Douglas as an authentic free-soil leader. It was against
this acceptance of Douglas by Republicans that Lincoln's
House Divided speech was primarily addressed. This is the
precedent that, I believe, I rightfully follow today in opposing
certain views of my fellow conservative Republicans.
My brethren, represented in particular by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, hold that constitutional "safeguards to individual
liberty" have "no intrinsic worth," are not grounded in any
"idea of natural justice," and derive whatever "moral good-
ness" they are alleged to have "simply because they have been
incorporated into a constitution by a people." This assertion is
nearly identical to Douglas's belief that the people may either
vote for slavery or vote against slavery, and that whether slav-
ery is lawful or not depends exclusively upon their will.
The Lecompton Constitution would have guaranteed
security and permanency to any property in slaves already in
Kansas in 1858, whether or not other slaves might later be
brought in from other slave states. However, Douglas had
opposed the Lecompton Constitution, not because of any con-
cessions it made to slavery, but because it was adopted in a
rump election marred by fraud; therefore, he maintained, it
was not a valid expression of the will of the people of Kansas.
However, opposed to voting fraud as much as Douglas, Lincoln
opposed Lecompton primarily because of the concessions it
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made to slavery. Lincoln did not think the people of the Terri-
tory of Kansas should vote on the question of whether to admit
slavery among their domestic institutions. Keeping slavery out
of the Territories should, he thought, be a matter of national
policy enacted by Congress. The wrongfulness of slavery, he
asserted, was grounded in "an abstract truth, applicable to all
men and all times." Like Judge Douglas and his followers, the
very idea of such truth, instructing us as to what is right and
what is wrong, is rejected today by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The Chief Justice writes that there is "no conceivable way that
I can demonstrate to you that the judgments of my [e.g., anti-
slavery or anti-Nazi] conscience are superior to the judgments
of your [e.g., pro-slavery or pro-Nazi] conscience."
Lincoln has asserted what is in fact the truth of the mat-
ter. It is that free political institutions presuppose an agree-
ment on certain principles in regard to right and wrong. These
principles are set forth in the second paragraph of the Declara-
tion of Independence, where it is said, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident . . . ." Voting does not legitimize these princi-
ples; the principles are what legitimize the voting. As Lincoln
said in the course of the joint debates, "[Judge Douglas] con-
tends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to
have them. So they have, if it is not a wrong. But if it is a
wrong, he cannot say that people have a right to do wrong."
In 1858, those of Dr. Stone's mind did not want Lincoln to
oppose Douglas for re-election to the Senate. They felt that he
was "dividing the house" of the free-soil coalition. They
thought Douglas had proven his practical effectiveness as an
anti-slavery leader in the fight against Lecompton. Like Dr.
Stone, they deprecated theoretical objections to what appeared
to them to be Douglas's practical effectiveness. Horace Gree-
ley, among others, did not see what difference it made whether
slavery was defeated under the aegis of popular sovereignty, by
a vote of the people of Kansas, or excluded, as Lincoln wished,
by Congress.
Lincoln continued to insist upon the re-enactment of the
Missouri Compromise restriction upon slavery, which provided
that the remaining Louisiana Territory north of the southern
border of Missouri, not already incorporated into a state,
should prohibit slavery forever. This restriction had been
repealed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, of which Sena-
tor Douglas was the author and chief sponsor. Douglas
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replaced the Congressional prohibition of slavery in the 1820
law with a policy of congressional "non-intervention" into slav-
ery matters in the States and Territories. Henceforth, accord-
ing to the language Douglas incorporated in the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the people of each Territory and each State
would be "perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic
institutions in their own way." This meant that the people of a
Territory would decide by their votes whether to include slav-
ery among their domestic institutions. The spirit of the Kan-
sas-Nebraska Act is indicated by the following passage from
Douglas's speech in the Alton joint debate with Lincoln: "[w]e
in Illinois ... tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and
finding that it was not profitable we abolished it for that rea-
son . . ." (emphasis added). For Lincoln, the Kansas-Nebraska
Act had, from the outset, represented an "open war with the
very fundamental principles of civil liberty, criticising the Dec-
laration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right
principle of action but self-interest" (emphasis in original).
For Lincoln, treating slavery as immoral, and making that
immorality the basis of all policy dealing with it, was as impor-
tant as the Missouri Compromise or any other limitation upon
the spread of slavery. For Lincoln, as for Madison and Jeffer-
son, the moral bankruptcy of slavery and the rightness of con-
stitutional government were but two sides of the same coin.
The requirement that "the just powers of government" be
derived from "the consent of the governed" is grounded upon
the prior recognition that all men are created equal. It is
human beings whose consent is required, not horses or dogs or
oxen or asses. This is not, as Chief Justice Rehnquist supposes,
a "political value judgment." "Value judgments" qua "value
judgments" are subjective. However, the difference between
man and beast is not subjective, but objective. Hence, the
moral judgments consequent upon the recognition of this dif-
ference are not subjective, but objective. Because men are not
beasts, they ought not be ruled as men may rule beasts. Nor
ought they to have toil imposed upon them by the uncontrolled
discretion of another as such toil is imposed upon a horse or an
ox or a mule. Nor is it a "value judgment" to refuse to equate
the stockyards where cattle are slaughtered with the extermi-
nation pens of Buchenwald and Auschwitz.
"Thou shalt not kill" has never been understood to refer
to beef cattle or to hogs or to sheep. "Thou shalt not steal" has
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never referred to the goods produced by the labor of horses or
of oxen. It is because it is an objective and self-evident truth,
and not a "value judgment," that no man is by nature a beast,
that none may arbitrarily be excluded from the class of those
whose consent is necessary for the powers of government to be
just. It is not a "value judgment" to say that the nature of a
man is different from the nature of a beast. Every human
being has, in Lincoln's words, "a natural right to put into his
mouth the bread that his own hand has earned." It is this
antecedent natural right to the product of one's labor that is
the foundation of the constitutional right that the product of
that labor may only be taxed with our consent.
If it is true, as a general rule, that no human beings are to
be regarded as so far inferior as to deserve to be treated as
beasts, it is also true that no human beings are to be regarded
as so far superior as to be deferred to as gods. Hence, the just
powers of government are not only derived from the consent of
the governed, but are defined and circumscribed by that same
consent. Each one of those living under the law has the same
right to participate in the political process whereby the laws he
lives under are made. Each and every one of those making the
laws has an identical obligation to live under the laws he has
made. It is not simply the will of the people that is to be para-
mount under the Constitution, but the rational and moral will,
formed in accordance with "the laws of nature and of nature's
God." This is the argument of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the American Revolution, and the American Founding,
of an essential, original, intrinsic, natural right. It is a right
that is moral and rational, no less than constitutional, that
informs the jurisprudence of a free people. As such, it embod-
ies, a fortiori, the "original intent" of the jurisprudence of the
Framers and Ratifiers of the American Constitution.
For Dr. Stone to say that I am "dividing the house" by
insisting upon this ground for a jurisprudence of original intent
is to stultify the very idea of such a jurisprudence. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's jurisprudence, accepted either implicitly or
explicitly by others whose doctrines Dr. Stone finds "whole-
some and necessary for the public good," is that of legal posi-
tivism built upon moral relativism. But without the authentic
and genuine morality of the true doctrine of "original intent,"
there is no principled ground upon which to resist liberal judi-
cial activism, and there can be no house to divide.
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After the defense of Judge Bork contained in Dr. Stone's
article, Judge Bork was nominated to the Supreme Court by
President Reagan. His nomination was rejected by the United
States Senate. The lengthy and bitter struggle over the Bork
nomination involved the Supreme Court in the political pro-
cess more profoundly than any event since President
Roosevelt's "court packing" plan of 1937.
What I believe to be the truth, although not the whole
truth, about that struggle was well expressed by Suzanne Gar-
ment in The War Against Robert H. Bork, in the January 1988
issue of Commentary. I regarded Judge Bork's enemies to be
the enemies of my understanding of the Constitution no less
than of his. While Judge Bork defended the conception of"original intent" in interpreting the Constitution, his oppo-
nents believed the Constitution, or at least all those clauses of
the Constitution that are open to interpretation, had virtually
no fixed meaning. Anything they regarded as wrong was a
wrong to be righted by the judicial process no less than by leg-
islative process. The question of whether to use the courts or
the legislatures to gain a particular end was only a question of
expediency, a question of which avenue offered the greater
chance of success. The Constitution was deemed to be a vehi-
cle for justice, and whatever was said to be justly claimed was
said to be claimed constitutionally.
Courts are not legislative bodies, and they may not and
ought not levy taxes. In addition, except in the case of law-
fully imposed fines, the courts have no constitutional authority
to transfer wealth. These maxims, however, did not seem to
restrain the demand for judicial activism on the part of Judge
Bork's enemies. The liberal judicial activist's "justice agenda"
redefined what had hitherto been understood to be the rule of
law. A dramatic, current example of how this agenda operates
has been furnished by the order of a federal court to the city of
Yonkers, New York, requiring it to build low cost housing as a
remedy for what the court found to be a pattern of discrimina-
tion. The city would have had to impose very substantial taxes
upon itself to carry out the order, taxes vehemently opposed
by a large majority of its citizens. The court thereupon
imposed fines both on the city and its officials, fines that would
in a relatively short time bankrupt both. City officials were
also subject to imprisonment for contempt of court. The order,
now on appeal, dramatically illustrates the usurpation of legis-
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lative authority, in this case the taxing power, by the judiciary.
Judge Bork and I are both opposed to such usurpation. It also
illustrates the importance of having justices on the Supreme
Court who, like Judge Bork, would vote to overrule such judi-
cial tyranny. A constitutional jurisprudence of "original
intent" has been viewed as a reactionary obstacle to justice by
those anxious to carry out "reform," as in Yonkers, through
the judiciary. In opposition to the dead hand of "original
intent," they call for a "living Constitution."
I publicly supported Judge Bork's nomination, and even
contributed money to his cause. As a matter of practical poli-
tics, I no more "divided the house" by opposing Judge Bork's
views on original intent than Lincoln "divided the house" by
opposing the cooperation of Republicans and Douglas Demo-
crats in the struggle to defeat Lecompton. Judge Bork's nomi-
nation failed precisely because his conception of "original
intent" was flawed. He was never able to command the moral
high ground that belonged to the genuine doctrine as held by
Jefferson and Madison. His opponents looked upon "original
intent" in the light, not of Lincoln's, but of Chief Justice
Taney's espousal of it. They saw "original intent" as having
once sanctioned slavery, and even later as having sanctioned
racial discrimination of the most odious kind. Judge Bork did
nothing to contradict this opinion. In fact, in the course of the
hearings, Senator Metzenbaum read to Judge Bork the identi-
cal passages on "original intent" I had cited from Chief Justice
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott.
Judge Bork's response was only to say that "the Devil can
quote Scripture," thereby conceding the accuracy of Chief Jus-
tice Taney's characterization of "original intent." He then
went on to repeat what Chief Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Meese
had said about Dred Scott: that the Court's great error was to
usurp the power of Congress by declaring unconstitutional the
limitation upon the extension of slavery in the Missouri Law of
1820. I have pointed out, however, that a hopelessly divided
Congress, in the Compromise of 1850, left the question of the
constitutional status of slavery in the Utah and New Mexico
Territories to the Supreme Court. As I noted, it had "laid the
baby on the doorstep of the Supreme Court, rang the bell, and
then disappeared." Three years before Dred Scott, in the Kan-
sas-Nebraska Act of 1854, Congress had repealed the Missouri
law's restriction upon the extension of slavery. This action was
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open to the interpretation, espoused by, among others, Senator
Stephen A. Douglas, that Congress had come to regard the
Missouri law's restriction as a wrongful policy. It certainly did
not preclude the view that the Supreme Court, in Dred Scott,
was merely following Congress, and not usurping its powers.
The attempt by Judge Bork, no less than Chief Justice Rehn-
quist or Mr. Meese, to treat Dred Scott as primarily a matter of
judicial usurpation shows as profound an ignorance of constitu-
tional history as Taney himself displayed in his opinion for the
Court in that case.
During the Bork hearings, I had occasion in a public dis-
cussion to confront someone who was a prominent member of
the Meese Justice Department, and who was a zealous advo-
cate of Bork's views on "original intent" and the limits of judi-
cial power. In a discussion of Dred Scott, he too insisted that
the abiding sin of the Court was in declaring unconstitutional
an act of Congress. I put the following hypothetical question
to him. Let us contemplate, I suggested, the case of Dred Scott
in reverse. Let us suppose that John C. Breckenridge had been
elected President in 1860, and that he had been elected on the
platform of the Southern Democratic Party, calling for a fed-
eral slave code for all the Territories. Let us further suppose
that Congress, acting upon this platform, passed just such a
law. Now let us suppose that Lincoln, not Taney, was Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and that a majority on the Court
held Lincoln's opinion concerning the constitutionality of slav-
ery in the Territories. Finally, let us suppose that Dred Scott
sued for his freedom on the ground that the law Congress had
passed enforcing slavery in the Territories was unconstitu-
tional. How did Judge Bork's adherent think that "Chief Jus-
tice" Lincoln, writing for the majority, would decide the case?
Our Borkian had no doubt that Lincoln, like Taney, would
have upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress guaran-
teeing slavery in the Territories. He did not think that Lin-
coln, or any sound constitutionalist, would interfere with the
legislative discretion of Congress "to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory . . .
belonging to the United States," under article IV, section 3 of
the Constitution. He saw no reason why Dred Scott, in these
circumstances, should not have remained a slave. But this is
preposterous. "Chief Justice" Lincoln would have said that
Congress had no lawful power under the fifth amendment to
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deprive any person, white or black, of his liberty, if that person
had not been lawfully convicted of a crime.
By way of contrast, Chief Justice Taney had used the fifth
amendment to say that Congress had no lawful power to
deprive any owner of his slave property in a Territory. To
reach this conclusion, he had first to decide that a Negro was
not a person within the meaning of the fifth amendment. This
he did by asserting that Negroes, whether free or slave, were
"beings of an inferior order . . . and so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
Because Lincoln asserted that the Negro was a human being,
and, according to the Declaration of Independence, possessed
the same natural rights as all other human beings, "Chief Jus-
tice" Lincoln would have held that a Negro was a person
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Lincoln would
have had no hesitation in pronouncing unconstitutional any
law passed by Congress which was based upon the premise that
the Negro was a chattel and not a human person. Our Borkian,
however, could not see that. Such blindness certainly had
much to do with Judge Bork's defeat.
It cannot be repeated too often that the central question in
Dred Scott was whether the Negro was, under "the laws of
nature and of nature's God," a human person entitled to that
personal liberty guaranteed to all persons in the fifth amend-
ment. The Borkians today are as unable as Chief Justice
Taney was in 1857 to say that anyone white or black has natu-
ral rights. Hence they are unable to see any foundation for
civil rights outside of positive law. That they may themselves
be in favor of civil rights without discrimination on the basis of
race is simply a matter of personal preference, a political value
judgment, which, as such, has no constitutional standing.
Judge Bork's inability to see the centrality of man's humanity
and natural rights as the constitutional issue in Dred Scott is
the reason he was unable to endow his version of "original
intent" with any moral authority. For Robert Stone to say that
Bork's jurisprudence is "wholesome and necessary for the pub-
lic good," in the light of such a defect, is inconsistent with any
respect whatever for the constitutionalism of Jefferson,
Madison, or Lincoln.
Because of the resemblance of Judge Bork's version of"original intent" to that of Chief Justice Taney, Judge Bork's
critics could insist, with some plausibility, that the authority of
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the Constitution had to be derived not from the reactionary
past, but from the liberal future. The principles of the Consti-
tution, they hold, are to be found in an "evolving" sense of jus-
tice. Just as Darwinian evolution displayed higher biological
forms of life emerging out of lower forms, conceptions of
morality and justice have evolved so as to distinguish the con-
cept of "original intent" in 1787 from that of 1987. A judge,
according to this view, should not be bound by "original
intent" because such intent is irrelevant to and inconsistent
with what the American people, the source of all constitutional
authority, rightly expect from our contemporary Constitution.
In arguing against "original intent," Judge Bork's opponents
also maintained that, whether desirable or not, it was a useless
concept because one could never know what that intent was, or
how it could be applied to problems the framers and ratifiers
never imagined. The following is characteristic of the language
used:
The text of the Constitution, as anyone experienced in
words might expect, is least precise where it is most impor-
tant.... History can be of considerable help, but it tells us
much too little about the specific intentions of the men who
framed, adopted and ratified the great clauses. The record is
incomplete, the men involved often had vague or even con-
flicting intentions, and no one foresaw, or could have fore-
seen the disputes that changing social conditions and
outlooks would bring before the Court .... One begins to
understand why so many judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
have despaired of the very possibility of neutral principles of
constitutional law and have succumbed to the temptations of
the interest-voting philosophy. What else is there?
The author of the foregoing was, however, not Justice Brennan
in 1987, but Judge Bork in 1968. I mention, in passing, that
"interest voting" and an "evolving" standard of justice are, in
today's political vocabulary, only two names for the same
thing. One simply identifies one's own interests, or one's own
passionately held opinions, with the higher standard. An
example is the ease with which so many in the civil rights
movement have passed from a movement against racial dis-
crimination, based upon the "neutral principle" of equal rights
for all human beings, into a movement for racial discrimina-
tion, based upon preferential treatment for "discrete and insu-
lar minorities." This they have done without any apparent
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consciousness of, much less admission of, any change of
principles.
In 1968, however, Judge Bork saw "two alternative philos-
ophies" to that of judicial "interest voting." One led to "a rela-
tively restrained Court, the other to a relatively activist
Court." The restrained Court would simply leave to the polit-
ical branches the definition of the Constitution. However, a
restrained Court should not be merely passive, but should do
much to "improve the quality and performance of the Ameri-
can political process," without itself attempting to achieve sub-
stantive ends of government. An example is the ordering of
re-districting when the electoral process cannot reform itself.
In 1968, however, Judge Bork was equivocal in his support for
this non-activist approach to the work of the Supreme Court:
A desire for- some legitimate form of judicial activism is
inherent in a tradition that runs strong and deep in our cul-
ture, a tradition that can be called "Madisonian." We con-
tinue to believe there are some things no majority should be
allowed to do to us, no matter how democratically it may
decide to do them. A Madisonian system assumes that in
wide areas of life a legislative majority is entitled to rule for
no better reason than that it is a majority. But it also
assumes there are some aspects of life a majority should not
control, that coercion in such matters is tyranny, a violation
of the individual's natural rights. Clearly, the definition of
natural rights cannot be left to either the majority or the
minority. In the popular understanding upon which the
power of the Supreme Court rests, it is precisely the func-
tion of the Court to resolve this dilemma by giving content
to the concept of natural rights in case by case interpreta-
tions of the Constitution.
I propose to show that there is much that is flawed in this
understanding of a jurisprudence of natural rights. Let us
however concede that, had Judge Bork propounded this under-
standing during the hearings on his nomination to the
Supreme Court, he would almost certainly have been con-
firmed. Much of the controversy during the hearings sur-
rounded his objections to the discovery by the Supreme Court
of a "right to privacy" in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Senators on the Judiciary Committee could not under-
stand Judge Bork's objection to a decision holding unconstitu-
tional a Connecticut statute forbidding the prescription by a
physician of contraceptives to a married couple. It was in this
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case that Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, discov-
ered a "right of privacy" among the "penumbras formed by
emanations" from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments. Douglas conceded that no such right was explicit
in the Constitution, but observed that "the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship" were so "sacred" as to
deserve constitutional protection. At his 1987 confirmation
hearings, Judge Bork conceded that the Connecticut law was"preposterous, ridiculous, absurd, and loony," but he would not
concede that these were reasons for regarding it unconstitu-
tional. Besides, he asked, might not a right of privacy extend
constitutional protection to otherwise illegal acts such as drug
use, wife abuse, and child abuse? In 1968, however, Judge
Bork took a very different view of the Griswold case.
At that time, he believed in the plausibility of a "legiti-
mate form of judicial activism." As a result, he found "a war-
rant for the Court to move beyond the limited range of
substantive rights that can be derived from traditional sources
of constitutional law." Such a warrant, he found, "persuasively
argued" in Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Gris-
wold, an opinion based upon the ninth amendment, which
states that "[t]he enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." Goldberg had written that "the ninth
amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that
fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in
the first eight amendments ... and an intent that the list of
rights included there not be deemed exhaustive." In 1968,
Judge Bork patronized this version of "original intent" juris-
prudence and was willing to concede that there was a natural
and constitutional "right of privacy in marriage." He then cor-
rectly assumed that it was an innocent right, one that might
not give protection to vicious or immoral acts when done in
private. Like Justice Goldberg, he did not see the right as an"emanation" from any of the first eight amendments, but as
one of the unenumerated rights protected by the ninth amend-
ment. However, he did not see the doctrine of unenumerated
rights as flowing from the social contract theory of the Ameri-
can Revolution. He did not understand that civil society was
understood by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution as
the result of contract and that only those rights necessary for
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the carrying out of the purpose of that contract were surren-
dered to civil society. All other rights were reserved.
This is the very basis of the idea of limited government
and the rule of law which underlies the Constitution. As the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 put it:
The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of indi-
viduals; it is a social compact by which the whole people con-
venants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole
people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good.
The premise upon which the right of contract, or compact,
rests, is that all men are born free and equal. It is this freedom
and equality which vests, in every human being, the natural
right to make contracts, including the basic contract that cre-
ates civil society. But the resulting power of government
extends only so far as the original contract authorizes. It is
this understanding of the ground of constitutionalism that is
embodied in the ninth amendment. All this escaped Judge
Bork in 1968, and he has not caught up with it yet. In 1968,
however, he did see that the protection of marital privacy con-
formed with the "popular understanding" of what was the
Court's function. In the hearings on his nomination, however,
he no longer regarded this as a constitutional consideration.
This was a fatal flaw in the eyes of Senators who thought, as
Judge Bork once thought, that the popular understanding
deserved high consideration.
What Judge Bork called the "Madisonian" alternative in
1968 was in fact no more characteristic of Madison than of his
contemporaries. Madison himself would never have dreamed
of calling the "concept of natural rights" Madisonian. Nor
would these natural rights, as the ground of the Constitution,
have been regarded by Madison, or any of his contemporaries,
as an optional alternative, any more than they would have
regarded human nature as an option for human beings. Being
natural, these rights constituted the only possible ground of a
genuine jurisprudence of "original intent." In this respect, the
correspondence between Madison and Jefferson and the law
faculty of the University of Virginia is illuminating.
In it, Madison and Jefferson commended to the faculty
that the first of the "best guides" to the principles of the gov-
ernments, of both Virginia and of the United States, was "the
Declaration of Independence as the fundamental act of union
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of these states." Neither Madison nor Jefferson thought, how-
ever, that these principles implied any a priori knowledge, as
with Kant's categorical imperative, of what particular judg-
ments these principles entailed. The morality of natural
rights, as the Declaration of Independence itself makes clear, is
a morality of prudence. These principles are the necessary, but
not the sufficient, ground of wise judgment. The Constitution
is a bundle of compromises, representing what was believed to
be the greatest good, and the least evil, attainable in the actual
circumstances of the United States in 1787. These principles,
while telling us that slavery is an evil, also tell us that, as Lin-
coln would say, the concessions to slavery in the Constitution
were intended to be in the service of human freedom. Without
the concessions, and without the prudence that dictated the
concessions, there would have been no stronger, more perfect
Union. Without these prudent concessions, there would have
been no union strong enough to accomplish what this union
accomplished within fourscore and seven years, by placing
slavery "in course of ultimate extinction."
Nothing in human affairs, observed Jefferson, "is
unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man"
(emphasis added). It is irrelevant that we do not know how
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and its amend-
ments would have applied any of its provisions under present
circumstances. "Original intent" means they intended us to
understand their handiwork in the light of its enduring princi-
ples, not in the light of either their or our own transient cir-
cumstances. When Judge Bork writes, as he did in 1968, of a
jurisprudence "of natural rights," arrived at "in case by case
interpretation of the Constitution," he is, without knowing it,
referring to a jurisprudence of "original intent." However,
Judge Bork, in 1968, qualified his call for such a jurisprudence
by asserting:
This requires the Court to have, and to demonstrate the
validity of, a theory of natural rights. A Court without such
a theory should candidly admit its lack, eschew policy ques-
tions, and practice restraint. Otherwise it will inevitably
deny the majority some of its legitimate power to rule, thus
abetting a tyranny of minorities.
But must the Court "demonstrate the validity" of "a theory"
which already constitutes the "original intent" of the framers
and ratifiers? If it is true, as Madison and Jefferson believed it
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to be, that the Declaration of Independence is "the fundamen-
tal act of union of these states," then its principles are a forti-
ori those of the Constitution. Furthermore, why would Judge
Bork think that any court of law should be considered either
legally or philosophically competent to make such a demon-
stration? This goes beyond even Justice Brennan's "evolution-
ary" conscience. There never has been any need for the Court
to engage in a philosophical justification of what the Constitu-
tion itself assumes to be true. That assumption is "original
intent." John Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Ogden v.
Saunders, in considering the "obligation of contracts" clause of
the Constitution, wrote the following:
When we advert to the course of reading generally pursued
by American statesmen in early life, we must suppose that
the framers of our constitution were intimately acquainted
with the writings of those wise and learned men, whose trea-
tises on the laws of nature and nations have guided public
opinion on the subjects of obligations and contracts. If we
turn to those treatises, we find them to concur in the decla-
ration that contracts possess an original intrinsic obligation,
derived from the acts of free agents, and not given by gov-
ernment. We must suppose that the framers of our Consti-
tution took the same view and the language they have used
confirms this opinion.
In 1825, Madison and Jefferson, in laying down required
texts for the law faculty of the University of Virginia, had also
declared that
as to the general principles of liberty and the rights of man,
in nature and society, the doctrines of Locke, in his "Essay
concerning the true original extent and end of civil govern-
ment," and of Sidney in his "Discourses on government,"
may be considered as those generally approved by our fellow
citizens of this, and of the United States.
Marshall did not name the "wise and learned men." However,
it is certain that, on the subject of "an original, intrinsic obliga-
tion derived from the acts of free agents and not given by gov-
ernment," that is to say, of natural rights as the ground of
constitutional rights, he and Jefferson and Madison expressed
doctrines first propounded in Locke and Sidney. It deserves
special attention that Marshall supposed that these doctrines
had "guided public opinion" while Madison and Jefferson
understood that the same doctrines were those "generally
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approved" of by their fellow-citizens. Hence what we may,
with propriety, call Lockeian natural rights and Lockeian con-
tractualism were deemed to be elements equally of the framing
and of the ratification processes.
Some two decades after his 1965 article, however, Judge
Bork abandoned any thought that the Supreme Court could
"demonstrate the validity of a theory of natural rights." In his
celebrated 1984 lecture, "Tradition and Morality in Constitu-
tional Law," he said that "constitutional law has very little the-
ory of its own and hence is almost pathologically lacking in
immune defenses." This reflects Judge Bork's own abandon-
ment of the "original intent" of the "Madisonian system" based
upon a "theory of natural rights." The pathology in question
lies, however, in his own jurisprudence, not in the Constitu-
tion. In the same lecture he also declared that "judges have no
mandate to govern in the name of contractarian or utilitarian
or what have you philosophy rather than according to the his-
torical Constitution." But the "Madisonian system" does
embrace a "contractarian" philosophy. One wonders whether
Judge Bork has ever read an opinion of John Marshall, not to
mention any of the relevant writings of James Madison.
Absent the demonstration of the theory of natural rights,
Judge Bork has turned to the only alternative he knows: "the
interest voting philosophy." He has turned, that is, to recom-
mending that the Court "eschew policy questions, and practice
restraint." By an amazing mutation of terminology, Judge
Bork now calls "original intent" the very doctrine that he had
proposed in 1968 as a substitute to the system he had called
"Madisonian."
In fact, however, Judge Bork never understood what was
meant by a "Madisonian system." In 1968, he commended it,
not because it was true but because it reflected "a tradition
which runs strong and deep in our culture." But the tradition
of equal natural rights does not run more strongly in our cul-
ture than very different traditions run in other cultures: the
tradition of stratified classes with untouchables at the bottom,
or the tradition of suttee in Hindu culture. There is hardly any
absurdity, polygamy, slavery, human sacrifice, self-mutilation,
public prostitution, which is not "sacred" or "strong and deep"
in the tradition of some culture. Judge Bork does not seem to
recognize any objective basis for evaluating cultures and their
different traditions. It was, however, the essence of the Ameri-
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can form of government, as understood by its founders, that it
began a new order of the ages, novus ordo seclorum, which
rejected all traditions inconsistent with what it regarded as
reason and nature. One cannot repeat too often Washington's
pronouncement that the foundations of our governments were"not laid in the gloomy ages of ignorance and superstition; but
at an epoch when the rights of mankind were better under-
stood and more clearly defined than at any other period."
For the Founding Fathers, the natural rights of mankind
were inherently different from the principles of any tradition,
however powerful, that reflected "ignorance and superstition."
In fact, the natural rights tradition of the Founding was largely
abandoned in the South in the generation before the Civil War.
The South Carolina doctrines, formulated during the struggle
over Nullification from 1828-1833, came to dominate the ante-
bellum South. The states which formed the Confederacy came
under the influence of the political thought of John C.
Calhoun.
In Calhoun's thinking, the reasoning which connected
political sovereignty, including state sovereignty, with the
equal natural rights of individual humans was entirely aban-
doned. In Calhoun's thinking, the rights of the "Madisonian
system," which were the rights of individuals, became the
rights of groups. But Calhoun's rights of groups are indistin-
guishable from the interests of those same groups. This is
clearest in the fact that the collective right of slaveholders to
preserve and protect slavery is in no way gainsaid by any indi-
vidual rights to freedom of the slaves. The interest of the
slaveholders in slavery constituted their moral right in slavery.
Although Calhoun himself would not have used the term, any
claim of right on behalf of the slaves would have been what
Justice Rehnquist calls "a political value judgment." Accord-
ing to Calhoun, an effective veto by the slaveholding interest
upon any action of the federal government tending to put slav-
ery "in course of ultimate extinction" was equally a moral and
a constitutional right. Judge Bork's jurisprudence in 1968,
although on the surface Madisonian, in fact is Calhounian,
notwithstanding the loathing that the historical Madison had
for the historical Calhoun.
We have heard Judge Bork declare that, in certain areas, a
majority has a right to rule "for no better reason than that it is
a majority." Without knowing it, Judge Bork has again
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broached an opinion that is the very negation of Madisonian
thought. By it, Bork shows that he is unaware of the logical
relationship connecting majority rule with minority rights.
For that logic we turn to Madison himself, writing in the light
of that same wisdom and learning that John Marshall had
praised. The following is an essay on "Sovereignty," written
near the end of Madison's life:
To go to the bottom of the subject let us consult the Theory
[sic] which contemplates a certain number of individuals as
meeting and agreeing to form one political society, in order
that the rights the safety and the interest of each may be
under the safeguard of the whole.
The first supposition is, that each individual being previ-
ously independent of the others, the compact which is to
make them one society must result from the free consent of
every individual.
But as the objects in view could not be attained, if every
measure conducive to them required the consent of every
member of society, the theory further supposes, either that
it was part of the original compact that the will of the major-
ity was to be deemed the will of the whole, or that it was a
law of nature, resulting from the nature of political society
itself, the offspring of the natural wants of man.
Whatever be the hypothesis of the origin of the lex
majoris partis, it is evident that it operates as a plenary sub-
stitute of the will of the majority of the society for the will
of the whole society; and that the sovereignty of the society
as vested in and exercisable by the majority, may do any-
thing that could be rightfully done by the unanimous con-
currence of the members; the reserved rights of individuals,
of conscience for example, in becoming parties to the origi-
nal compact being beyond the legitimate reach of sover-
eignty, wherever vested or however viewed.
We see again that the right, and limits of the right, of the
majority to rule must be understood first and foremost in the
light of that "original compact" by which political society is
formed. The ground of that compact is the equal natural right
of every individual, by his own consent, to become a member
of the body politic. This is but another expression of the
thought embodied in the great proposition "that all men are
created equal." Political authority in society, thus formed,
devolves upon the "majority." This majority is the "plenary
substitute" for the will of the whole society. It is, however,
[Vol. 13:511
Reply to "Jaffa Divides the House"
such a "plenary substitute" only for those purposes to which
unanimous consent has already been given.
The unanimous consent which gives rise to government
would be self-defeating if government could act only by unani-
mous consent. The majority is that substitute for unanimity
which makes effective government possible and which does not
derogate from the equality of the original contracting or con-
senting parties. However, the very fact that the authority of
the majority derives only from those purposes to which all
have unanimously consented, specifies both the purposes and
the limits of that authority. The majority never rules, as Judge
Bork mistakenly supposes, merely because it is a majority. It
is also the case that, in instituting government by unanimous
consent "to secure these rights," civil society authorized the
majority, primarily through the legislative power, to specify
the means by which the rights are to be secured. In short, the
"Madisonian system" of natural rights is a system for authoriz-
ing legislation, and only derivatively does it provide a role for
the judiciary. The will of the people, in the exercise of their
natural rights, is to be sovereign. The judiciary, as the 78th
Federalist declares, is to exercise judgment rather than will.
In short, the theory of natural rights, while providing a strong
argument for the protection by the courts of the reserved
rights of individuals, nonetheless provides a much stronger and
more principled argument against proto-legislative judicial
activism than do any of the latter day "originalists."
Madison says that the majority acts as the substitute for
the entire society. But he goes beyond this when he declares
that the majority "may do anything that could be rightfully
done by . . . unanimous concurrence" (emphasis added). We
see that the reserved rights of individuals control the scope of
authority of the majority, and direct the majority to those
objects which represent a common interest of all the citizens.
That is why every elected official is deemed to represent those
who voted against him no less than those who voted for him.
However, not even unanimous consent will authorize the exer-
cise of powers over subjects which are understood by the origi-
nal contract to remain among the reserved rights of
individuals.
As an example, Madison mentions the right of conscience.
The right to act upon unanimous consent, no less than the
right of the majority, is confined to ends which are rational
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and moral. Madison himself placed the emphasis upon right-
fully. To understand the full and inner meaning of a jurispru-
dence of "original intent," we are reminded that independence
was declared in 1776, not merely by a people, but by a "good
people," who had confidently and conscientiously affirmed the"rectitude of their intentions" to the "supreme judge of the
world."
Jefferson, writing to Spencer Roane in 1819, said that the
ultimate authority for the meaning of the Constitution must
rest in the people as a whole, not in the judiciary, or in any
other branch of government, observing that "independence can
be trusted nowhere but with the people en mass. They are
inherently independent of all but moral law." We see here
that the exception is the very ground of the rule. Without the
moral law, the people is not a people. No less than for any
classical, or Christian, or Jewish writer, for Jefferson and
Madison, a people is distinguished from a band of robbers.
Civil society is not collective selfishness. It is the moral code of
civilized society as such, which must be understood to underlie
the jurisprudence of a free people. Positive law, and especially
constitutional law, must be seen in its relationship to the natu-
ral moral law.
Dr. Stone found that I had also "divided the house" with
respect to the allegedly wholesome doctrines of Jeane Kirkpat-
rick, Irving Kristol, and Martin Diamond. I believe that my
differences with these worthies are essentially the same as
those I have elaborated with respect to Judge Bork, and it
would be merely weaving Penelope's web to repeat them.
For those of unsated appetite, however, I would recom-
mend Jeane Kirkpatrick: Not Quite Right, by Charles Kesler,
in the October 29, 1982 National Review. I would here add
only that nothing in my critique or Professor Kesler's article in
any way diminishes our admiration for Ambassador Kirkpat-
rick as a peerless spokesman for American interests in the
international arena.
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